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This paper considers three challenges to the mature European welfare
states posed by economic and social integration, demographic changes,
and the alleged decline of state capacity in the form of fiscal extraction in
an era of globalization. I argue that the experiences of the older member
states in the European Union are difficult to reconcile with the common
assertions that globalization necessarily leads to a “race to the bottom”
where welfare spending is downsized to the lowest common denominator. I
develop a set of hypotheses on plausible linkages between demographic
challenges, globalization, political capacity, and welfare spending, and
test the propositions in an empirical analysis of 14 European Union mem-
ber states from 1983 to 1998. My empirical results suggest that economic
integration does not pose a threat to European welfare states. Rather,
demographic changes such as low fertility rates and the aging of the popu-
lation and their political implications for political leaders’ incentives are
more serious challenges for the continuation of the welfare state in Europe.
Keywords: Welfare state, European integration, globalization, state capacity
The welfare state presently faces a number of challenges to its continuation,
at least in its present form. Many current studies on welfare states agree
that many governments have been forced to adopt austerity measures in
their economic and social spending in the wake of economic recession.
Researchers have identified a variety of reasons, both external and internal,
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that contribute to the stagnation and possible rolling back of the welfare
state.1 In this paper, I discuss some of the main international and domestic
challenges confronting the welfare state, and evaluate the ability of states
to face these challenges.
Globalization has arguably weakened the nation-state as an economic
and political unit, while at the same time increased the power of other alterna-
tive political units, such as smaller regions within the nation-states, and the
political impact and role of “non-political” actors with purely commercial
interests (Cerny, 1999). Likewise, European integration aims to create supra-
national political and economic institutions that seem to challenge the primacy
of the nation state and its effectiveness to regulate the welfare of its citizens.
The ability of states to respond to a changing economic environment is
constrained or enhanced by a state’s political capacity, or a state’s ability
to implement and enforce policies. Although state capacity in principle
could be envisioned and measured along many different dimensions,
Arbetman and Kugler (1997, p. 12) hold that revenue extraction is a par-
ticularly important aspect of state capacity, as this measurement indicates
a government’s political reach or power to influence its citizens. States
that have greater extractive capacity are more efficient in implementing
their chosen policies. These states can clearly assemble and command
more resources, the higher the actual tax raised. The actual level of
extraction relative to the potential will also tap whether a state has effec-
tive means of influencing the life of its citizens and the ability to enforce
its policies.
At the domestic level, a rapidly aging population and a shrinking labor
force augur markedly higher future costs for maintaining welfare benefits
at current levels for most European states. The extended longevity of the
populations combined with lower fertility rates in most European countries
will increase the number of people over the retirement age entitle to costly
pensions and care services, while the economically active population is
shrinking, both in absolute numbers as well as a relative proportion in
relation to the size of the nonworking population. The growth in the number
of entitled will clearly increase the economic and social burden that must be
carried by tax contributions from the economically active population.
1In this study, I used the terms welfare programs, welfare transfers, and welfare state inter-
changeably to denote state intervention in the distribution of social and economic and social
resources to enhance equity or guarantee a minimum level of income. Welfare transfers include
either direct re-allocation of resources such as pensions and direct transfers for segments of the
population in need, or financial transfer to provide for unexpected contingencies such as unem-
ployment and sickness. The welfare transfer variable that I apply in the empirical analysis in
this paper includes different types of social protection, as defined by the European Commis-
sion (2000), Eurostat (2000) and OECD (2000), encompassing pensions, sickness benefits, and
unemployment benefits, but not health benefits.
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The domestic and international challenges that European countries cur-
rently face, also in turn, alter the policy options available to governments
for maintaining the current levels of welfare provisions. Many observers
fear that increasing financial and trade integration among states coupled
with these demographic trends combine to pressure these European govern-
ments to downsize welfare provisions, leading to a “race to the bottom”
where states cut spending to complete with states offering less generous
welfare benefits. Abundant evidence suggests that many of the traditional
European welfare states such as France, Germany, and Italy are in the
process of shrinking the range and scope of their institutions to remain
competitive with other non-European states with fewer such constraints.
Most recent studies on the welfare states have focused exclusively on a
single set of challenges to the welfare state—either consequences of glo-
balization or domestic challenges, such as demographic changes. As a
result, existing studies have not to date examined how the different inter-
nal and external challenges to the welfare state relate to one another, and
how they impact the political ability of governments to enforce public
policies. To evaluate accurately the future prospects of the European
welfare states, one must take into account both the direct and indirect
effects of “internal” and “external” constraints on welfare provisions and
their impact on the capacity of states. In this paper, I try to address this
issue by exploring the impact of both external and internal factors on wel-
fare state provision and simultaneously accounting for their impact on
state capacity and political stability, measured as the probability of a con-
stitutional change in executive government.
Despite the common view that globalization poses a major challenge to
the welfare state, my analysis suggests that the experiences of states in the
European Union countries is difficult to reconcile with the assertions that
globalization necessarily must lead to a “race to the bottom” in welfare
provision. I find evidence suggesting that neither increasing financial
integration nor trade openness must fundamentally undermine state
capacity, but actually can give state more leverage in devising social and
economic policies to respond to changing social demands. The main chal-
lenges to European welfare programs are primarily domestic in nature.
Demographic changes such as an aging population can indeed impose
severe constraints on the ability of European states to maintain their
current levels of welfare spending. However, resources and gains from
globalization can help counteract these consequences, and help states
enact policies to maintain welfare provisions such as increasing the active
population base to finance government services.
The paper is organized in four sections. In the following section, I
develop the theoretical argument that motivations this paper. I first dis-
cuss in greater detail the internal and external challenges that welfare
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states face, focusing on the old member states the European Union. I then
relate the welfare state to its broader political dimensions and purposes,
and discuss the relationship between state capacity and the future of the
European welfare state. The subsequent section develops the research
design for testing these propositions empirically, and describes the spe-
cific variables and data sources used in the empirical analysis. The next
section gives an extended discussion of the empirical results and their
implications for the theoretical propositions. The final section concludes
the paper and provides some suggestions for future research.
WELFARE STATE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
Outside the role of economics markets, in most contemporary capitalist
economies there are a variety of government services and programs that have
a substantial additional impact on the welfare of individual citizens.2 Welfare
spending has been an integral component of the development and consolida-
tion of the states in the developed economies in the world. Pierson (2001a),
Manow (2001), and Rhodes (2001) argue that the modern welfare state is not
just a protective mechanism against certain particular market failures in capi-
talist economies, but rather must be considered an integral component of
modern capitalism and the social fabric of developed economies3.
Western welfare states have three primary goals: redistribution, effi-
ciency, and social cohesion. The welfare state distributes either direct
funds or services in-kind to secure the working population from contingen-
cies such as involuntary unemployment, sickness and injuries, maternal
leaves, and old-age retirement.4 Welfare programs correct market imper-
fections (e.g. adverse selection and externalities), while contributing to
social cohesion and facilitating political consensus.5
2In this paper, I use the term “welfare” to denote the specific policies and services provided
by the state.
3Historians usually credit imperial Germany as the forerunner of modern welfare programs.
In the late nineteenth century, Chancellor Bissmarck instituted the first social security legislation
in an efforts to shift the loyalties of the working class away from socialism and communism and
the labor movement. The provision of social insurance helped maintain political stability and
greatly strengthened the German state (Flora and Heidenheimer, 1981 pp. 18–19). On the politi-
cal factors that shaped the welfare institution, see Korpi (1989), Usui (1994), and Shalev (1987).
4The primary recipient of welfare transfers and social security tends to be middle class,
which carries significant political weight (Mucller, 2000).
5John Mucller (2000), a senior economic advisor and a Reagan Republican conservative,
applied simulation and forecasting models to study who does benefit and lose if the Federal
Government were to privatize Social Security. To his surprise, the analysis showed that private
institutions could not efficiently provide the same degree of stability and security as state sup-
ported social security. Single men were the only group who stood to benefit from privatizing
social security because they tend to have higher incomes and lower life expectancy.
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Governments redistribute resources for two main reasons, either to
remain in power or to facilitate the participation of certain segments of the
population in economic and social life. In this paper, I argue that the
former reason (social cohesion) tends to be more important than the latter
(redistribution) for governments, unless there are exceptional political and
private benefits involved.6 This assumption is consistent with Bueno de
Mesquita and Root (2000) argument that governing elites redistribute
wealth to secure a winning coalition and remain in power. In autocracies,
winning coalitions are small, making the redistribution of wealth a private
good and an alternative to secure political power. In democracies, by
contrast, the larger size of the electorate forces governments to secure
winning coalitions through public goods such as comprehensive insur-
ance systems and extensive unemployment benefits. Redistribution can in
this context reduce the likelihood that governments will lose power with-
out necessarily reducing income inequality.7
Although governments redistribute resources to maintain political
stability, they must also ensure that redistribution does not undermine the
long-run viability of the political system. Policies to remain in power in
the short-run may have adverse long-run effects if welfare programs con-
strain economic growth. More intense redistribution of resources involves
the greater taxation of wealth. Consequently, redistribution causes disincen-
tives to investment, and has a negative impact on economic growth through
lower levels of investment (Alesina and Rodrik, 1991, 1994; Perotti, 1993,
1996; Persson and Tabellini, 1994, Meltzer and Richard, 1981).
Welfare states are efficient and viable when the short-term goals of
redistributing resources among the members of the winning coalition do
not undermine longer-term goals of equity and political stability. The
6Goodin and Le Grand (1987) emphasize that some welfare programs function as “redistri-
bution over life cycle.” That implies that transfers are not always from the well-off to the less
fortunate, but rather transfers that offer security to the well-off. The best example is contribu-
tions to pensions where government transfers resources to employees after they retire usually in
proportion to their salaries.
7An extensive study by the International Labor Office shows that benefits from public
expenditures are not equally distributed in developing countries. The decision-making process
is remote from most of the rural population, leading to larger differences within countries. The
majority of poor households is located in rural areas and receives little support (Lecaillon et al.,
1984, pp. 128–130). A more detailed analysis of itemized public expenditures in various coun-
tries shows that not all public expenditures enchance redistribution (Lecaillon et al., 1984).
Social welfare expenditures may seem progressive, but upon examining the composition of
expenditures taken, it is clear that most of social welfare expenditures are pensions. Most
recipients of pension in developing countries are civil servants from middle or higher income
groups, and poor segments of the population received little of the social welfare transfers.
Health expenditures display similar tendencies. Moreover, expenditures on higher education
tend to be regressive (Lecaillon et al., 1984, pp. 166–168).
144 T. Gizelis
development-path of country’s political and economic dynamics deter-
mines the policy choices between equity and consensus building. Social
cohesion implies that a critical proportion of the population supports the
political system that governs the interaction between state and society and
provides the political system with legitimacy. Greater popular approval
can reduce the risk of political conflict and disruption.
In developed countries, short-term and long-term goals are coordinated
by welfare programs combining a more egalitarian income distribution with
stable political system and economic development. Welfare transfers are a
combination of selective private transfers, targeting politically important
segments of the population, and universal transfers. Demographic changes,
such as an increasing share of elderly dependents, will alter political
demands and “who gets what” within a society. Similarly, unemployment
and the growth of female labor modify the composition of welfare recipi-
ents and create opposing demands to those of the older population.
Whereas much of the existing literature focuses on these tends in isolation,
I will consider the overall effects of economic integration, demographic,
and social changes jointly on demand for welfare programs, and assess the
ability of the European states to respond to such processes. It is pertinent to
study the effects both of an aging population and increasing numbers of
female labor in European markets to understand the competing interests
and pressures that the electorate imposes on the governments. Since the
raison d’ être of the European welfare states has always been political and
social cohesion, I cannot evaluate the constraints on welfare programs
unless I assess the leeway governments have to strike legislate bargains and
build political coalitions before social cohesion erodes.
Economic and Demographic Trends
Aging European Population
Despite the significance of demographic factors on welfare costs and
demands, few research designs have taken into account their impact on
governments’ expenditure patterns and/or have focused on the aging of
European populations.8 Two fundamental demographic changes affect
welfare expenditures. The first major social and demographic change is
the increasing paticipation of women in the labor force. Barring extensive
immigration, women currently constitute the only sources for growth in
the labor force for the near future. The second factor is the extended
longevity of the European populations, combined with lower fertility
8For more on the significance of demographic factors to determine the level of public
expenditures and the types of programs and services that the state provides, see Pampel and
Williamson (1989, pp. 165–168).
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rates. The share of the population under 15 has fallen by one fifth over the
last three decades, according to Eurostat. Increasing longevity and low fertil-
ity rates combine to increase the demands on the welfare state by both the
increasing numbers of retired and pensioners, and shrinking the absolute and
relative size of the working population in the long run.9 These demographic
changes and the changes in social norms permitting nontraditional forms of
households, e.g., single parent households, cohabitations, challenge the
initial structures on which European welfare states were built. As a result,
household structures in European countries have undergone a major trans-
formation from a traditional nuclear family of 3–4 members to single-
member households. The premise of nuclear families, with husbands as
principal breadwinners and women as the principal care providers for elderly
and children, still remains the general foundation of the welfare institutions.
Long-term Unemployment
Europe has historically had much less unemployment than the United States.
However, beginning in the mid-1980s, most European states saw a dramatic
increase in the rates of unemployment, in many states leading to rates well
above the U.S. average of 6.21% (Sjöberg, 2000, p. 59).10 Changes in the
institutional structure of labor markets in the late 1960s and early 1970s,
motivated by concerns of equity and income distribution, led to more rigid
labor markets and increased unemployment in the major European econo-
mies (i.e., France, Germany). New rules on working time, more generous and
accessible unemployment benefits, and restrictions on lay-offs reduced the
difference between the lowest wage and unemployment benefits in many
European countries (Siebert, 1997). These institutional changes affected the
cleaning capacity of labor markets, as the demand for labor weakened and
labor supply was distorted (Siebert, 1997). The long-term effects of the labor
market rigidities were twofold: a failure to meet global competitive standards,
and rising long-term unemployment in many European countries. Without
greater wage flexibility and institutional structures that are supportive of job
supply, unemployment is likely to remain high with devastating social conse-
quences. Long-term unemployed people generally lose their skills and quali-
fications relative to those recently employed (Siebert, 1997, p. 53).
Despite the common belief that welfare programs are the “usual sus-
pects” in rising unemployment, empirical studies lend little support to that
argument. The direct effect of welfare benefits on unemployment is rather
marginal, while the institutional structure of unemployment benefits
might contribute to labor market rigidities (Sjöberg, 2000, p. 71). Many
9Fertility rates also decline due to the increasing numbers of divorces and lower rates of
marriage.
10Nevertheless, not all of the European countries follow the same patterns in unemploy-
ment rates and some of them actually have much lower rates than the United States.
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European countries, in particular the Mediterranean countries Italy,
Greece, Spain, and Portugal, face problems of high unemployment among
people under 25, even though welfare programs in these countries are
rather limited compared to Northern Europe.
Female participation in the labor force compounds the problems of
increasing unemployment. Female labor is of particular interest, as the
majority of women continue to be employed in occupations that are low-
paid and lack job security. Even in the most developed European welfare
states, women have to balance the dual roles of family and career. Higher
levels of unemployment among young people and women can create
political pressures on governments and their choices regarding welfare
programs. Future changes in labor supply can dramatically alter demo-
graphic structures in European countries and vice versa. The linkage
between changes in the European labor force and demographic structures
attest to how any examination of welfare programs in the European labor
market must include not only each of the forces but also how they interact
simultaneously (European Commission, 200, p. 63).
Globalization and Economic Integration
Globalization is widely believed to threaten the survival of the welfare
state Rodrik (1997) argues that globalization in its economic expression
makes it more difficult for governments to maintain social integration and
social cohesion through welfare policies. Schwartz (2001, pp. 43–44)
argues that even though the formal structures of welfare programs remain
intact, new strategies and global methods of production have eroded tradi-
tional political and property rights and put pressures on firms to outsource
production outside of the European markets. Schwartz’s argument does
not postulate a dichotomy between “internal” and “external” causes of
welfare decline, and it does not point at globalization as the main culprit of
the decline of the welfare state. Rather, Schwartz argues that market pres-
sure and competition erode traditional property rights, which emerged
after the industrialization period, and favor new actors with different kinds
of property rights and different policy preferences (Schwartz, 2001, p. 44).
In principle, globalization allows for greater labor flexibility, where the
unemployed can relocate to different regions, and competitive markets will
clear unemployment.11 The movement of labor undermines social cohesion
11In the 2000 opening of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, Swiss President
Adolf Ogi states that ordinary people's “feelings have been evident in Seattle and, if we are
honest with ourselves, we all know that this is not the last we have heard of it. There is no
longer any possibility for economists to escape social responsibility”(Higgins, 2000). The large
demonstrations in Gothenbrug and Geneva in 2001 and Barcelona in 2002 similarly attest to
the widespread dissatisfaction with globalization.
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and the foundation of the national welfare programs. This labor mobility
remains an issue of contention within the European Union where the
states maintain their exclusive rights in administering the national welfare
programs. Moreover, the alleged effects of globalization on state capacity
contribute to the weakening of the welfare state. The effects of globaliza-
tion suggest the presence of a “race to the bottom” and retrenchment in
welfare programs in developed capitalist economies as an adjustment to
compete in the global economy (Pierson, 2001b; Schwartz, 2001; Iversen,
2001).
Despite the pressures from both the international markets and conser-
vative regimes such as the United States under Reagan and Great Britain
under Thatcher, the institutions of the welfare states have remained sur-
prisingly resilient. Pierson (1996, p. 179) attributes the survival of the
welfare states to cautions government policies that have tried to avoid
direct confrontation with relevant actors. Some hold that the detrimental
consequences of globalization for the welfare state have been greatly
overstated. Swank (2001) focuses on how preexisting domestic institu-
tions have been able to respond to market actors who promoted deregu-
latory policies and privatization. Pierson (2001a) and Iversen (2001) point
out that the halt of deindustrialization process and domestic pressures on
mature welfare states explain the stagnation observed since the 1970s.
The ability of European states to respond to the changing social and
demographic environment is constrained by a state’s political capacity or
its ability to implement policies. The current domestic and international
challenges European countries face alter the available governmental pol-
icy choices. Increasing financial and trade integration and demographic
trends create both new pressures as well as policy options. As European
democracies maintain political power through democratic electoral pro-
cedures, increasing economic integration may also alter the political
capacity of the European governments to carry out welfare state pro-
grams. Similarly, competing demands from local groups lead to structural
changes in welfare programs, but not necessarily to “a race to the bot-
tom.” As long as European states maintain their control over domestic
social cohesion will also remain the fundamental goal behind welfare
programs. 
HYPOTHESES AND RESEARCH DESIGN
Hypotheses
In this study, I explore the impact of both external and internal factors on
welfare state and simultaneously account for changing levels in state
capacity and probability of a constitutional government change. 
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Figure 1 illustrates and suggests that the two indicators of globaliza-
tion—trade openness and foreign direct investment—should have a dumping
effect on welfare transfers, as it is expected by the literature that supports a
“race to the bottom” effect. Similarly, increasing economic integration and
globalization of production are expected to reduce state capacity, the ability
of states to respond and adapt to the external challenges.
H1: Higher levels of trade openness and FDI reduce welfare transfers.
H2: Higher levels of trade openness and FDI reduce state capacity.
The decline in state capacity due to increasing integration has a spiral-
ing negative effect on welfare transfers as the countries have less policy
option to implement economic policies (e.g., the European countries
loose all their monetary policy instruments). Most importanty, a decline
in state capacity threatens the ability of governments to remain in power,
unless the government can satisfy the demands of various political and
economic interest groups.
H3: Lower levels of state capacity reduce welfare transfers.
















    State Capacity
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H4: Lower levels of state capacity increase the likelihood of government
change.
Following the line of through that European governments still need to
be responsive to the demands of the electorate, H5 and H6 link the
demands of specific groups to an increase in welfare transfers. If in the
European labor market labor growth comes from women, then the
demands for easier access to child care and family leave will expend and
increase. The same goes for levels of unemployment, especially in the
Northern European welfare states, where the family does not play a very
active role in providing income security. The pressures of unemployment
might be lower in Southern Europe where families still protect the indi-
vidual members of the family.
H5: Higher levels of total unemployment and female labor increase wel-
fare transfers.
The population over 64 is the largest recipient of welfare transfers,
either in the form of pensions or in the form of medical and health insur-
ance. So the expectation is that demands on European welfare states will
increase as the European population ages. The increasing demands from
the older segments of the population will compete, though, with the
demands of female labor and unemployed as each group has different
needs to satisfy. Hence, even though the direct effect of the aging of the
population might be positive on welfare transfers the type of programs
can vary, according to which group has higher electoral power. In this
paper, I only deal with the direct impact on the overall level of welfare
transfers rather than specific programs.
H6: Higher percentage of people 64+ increases welfare transfers.
This paper postulates that political stability and social cohesion are the
two most prominent motivating forces behind the establishment of the
European welfare states. Unless we can make an argument that
the relationship between citizens and the national state has eroded in the
European countries, the political calculus of the governing elites will
include welfare transfers. Hence, I expect that a government at risk of los-
ing power will increase welfare transfers, at least toward their support
groups. Reversing the argument the expectation is that higher level of
welfare transfers will reduce the likelihood of government change and
will increase state capacity, as the state maintains an active role in the
redistribution of resources.
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H7: Higher levels of welfare transfers reduce the likelihood of government
change.
H8: Higher levels of welfares transfers increase state capacity.
H9: Higher likelihood of government change increases welfare transfers.
H10: Higher likelihood of government change reduces state capacity.
Estimation Method and Data Description
To test hypotheses 1–8, I estimate the following set of simultaneous equa-
tions on pooled data on 14 European countries from 1983–1988.
Where
W = level of welfare transfers,
P = probability of major regular government change,
SC= state capacity,
X = other predetermined variables, which include ratio of population
over 64, economic growth; levels of female employment, levels
of unemployment among the under 25, degree of financial inte-
gration (globall), trade openness, contract intensive money (CIM)
which accounts for property rights, and percentage of electoral
votes for leftist parties (leftv).
ε = error terms.
Although Austria, Finland, Portugal, Spain and Sweden became mem-
bers later than 1983, I assume that either they were already undergoing
social and economic convergence, or they were in comparable levels of
development to the existing members, prior to joining the European
Union. Being an outlier, Luxembourg is excluded, due to the combination
of its small size and population and the highest GDP per capita in the
European Union
To estimate the interactive effects between welfare transfers (W), state
capacity (SC), and political stability (PS), I use three-stage least-squares
(3SLS) estimation, which allows the error terms of the three equations to
be correlated. The procedure requires three steps: 1.) calculate the 2SLS
estimates of the identified equations; 2.) use the 2SLS estimates to estimate
W P SC X
P W SC X
SC W P X
w w w w w
p p p p p
pc pc pc pc p
= + + +
= + + +
= + + +
γ ζ α ε
γ ζ α ε
γ ζ α ε c (1)
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the structural equations’ errors and then use these to estimate the contem-
poraneous variance-covariance matrix of the structural equations’ errors; 3.)
apply GLS to the large equation representing all the identified equations
of the system.
The 3SLS estimator is consistent and in general is asymptotically more
efficient than the 2SLS estimator. If the disturbances in the different equa-
tions are uncorrelated, so that the contemporaneous variance-covariance
matrix of the disturbances of the structural equations is diagonal, 3SLS
collapses to 2SLS (for more details, see Greene, 1990). Since data on rel-
ative political capacity and political instability were not available for
1995 to 1998, I extrapolated estimates for 1995 through 1998, based on
country-specific trends.
Any simultaneous equations model is sensitive to specification problems.
The choice of exogenous variables was based on previous research (Feng
and Gizelis, 2002; Feng et al., 2000; Iversen, 2001; Pampel and Williamson,
1989; Swank, 2001; Siebert, 1997; Sjöberg, 2000) that identifies variables
and competing hypotheses on political stability, state capacity, and wel-
fare transfers. The proposed theoretical model tries to capture the key
socioeconomic and demographic process currently evolving in European
states. Most of these processes are interconnected and influence govern-
mental policies. It makes sense, both theoretically and empirically, look at
how these variables are interrelated and determine the policy choice of the
European countries. Using simultaneous equations, I can identify the
cross effects of state capacity and political stability on welfare transfers
and vice versa controlling for degrees of economic integration, demo-
graphic changes, and unemployment levels.
Welfare Transfers (W)
Various indicators have been adapted to measure welfare programs. Some
studies use government expenditures, exclusive of military and educa-
tional expenditures. Other studies focus on health care, social insurance
transfers, and pensions. The IMF’s Government Finance Statistics defines
welfare transfers, based on a narrow definition of welfare expenditures
and social security as transfer payments compensating for a reduction or
less of income. While social security expenditures consist of pensions and
retirement benefits, by far the largest component of welfare state trans-
fers, welfare payments are provided as assistance to groups with special
needs, such as old people and the handicapped (Government Finance
Statistics, 2001, pp. 71–72).
Eurostat uses a far more integrative definition of welfare expenditures
that includes both private and public institutions. The Eurostat data
include “all interventions from public and private bodies which intend to
relieve households and individuals of the burden of a defined set of risks
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or needs provided that there is neither a simultaneous reciprocal nor an
individual arrangement involved. The list of risks is fixed by convention
as; sickness/health care, disability, old age, survivors, family/children,
unemployment, housing, social exclusion not elsewhere classified”
(European Social Statistics: Social Protection, 1980–1998; European
Commission, 2000, p. 7). Social protection expenditures can be broken
down into social benefits, administration costs, transfers to other
schemes, and other expenditures. In the context of this study I use the
Eurostat measurement, since it is the primary statistical service for the
European Union.
State Capacity (SC)
State capacity consists of two related concepts; a) political extraction and
b) political reach (Arbetman and Kugler, 1997, p. 12). Political extraction
involves ability of a government to gather necessary resources to imple-
ment its policies. Political reach pertains to government’s ability to influ-
ence its population. Developed countries will already have high levels of
state capacity. Hence, higher level of welfare transfers may in some sense
indicate a decline in political extraction, since developed countries have
reached their maximum level of extractive abilities (Willett, 1997).
Kugler (Kugler et al., 1998–2001) has developed a measure of state
capacity, Relative Political Capacity (RPC), and it is based on the ratio of
a state’s actual government revenue to the predicted revenue.12 The RPC
ratio is a measurement of the ability of governments to penetrate society
and to extract resources. States that have higher levels of RPC are more
efficient to implement policies, not only because they acquire more
resources, but also because state mechanisms are more efficient in accessing
the population.
Probability of government change (PS)
Feng (1997) provides estimates for several patterns of political instability.
The first is regime change, which alter the norms and the institutional
structures of the political system. The second pattern is political realign-
ments, which reflect changes in the political parties or executive in control,
but not fundamental changes in the political system. Feng (1997) has esti-
mated the probability of government change, which takes a value of one if
a change occurred in the control of the executive, and zero otherwise,
using limited dependent variable model (logistic regression) over pooled
12The predicted revenue is estimated using the following regression equation: 
Tax/GDP = β0 + β1(time) + β2(mining/GDP) + β3(agricultural/GDP) + β4(Exports/GDP) + ε 
(Kugler, et al., 1998–2001).
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time-series cross-national data. The probability of government change is a
function of a group of economic variables (inflation, previous levels of
consumption, income); political variables (coups, riots, assassinations,
strikes), and political structure variables (executive selection, selection of
legislature). All of these variables capture different sources of political
instability. In the estimation of the political stability, the economic vari-
ables reflect the overall economic performance of the government, whereas
the political variables are indicators of imminent dissatisfaction with the
political system (or the government). The political structure variables
capture systemic instability (Feng, 1997). The fitted values of the logit
model are used to estimate the probability of government change for each
country. To explore the dynamics between the welfare state and likeli-
hood of government change for the developed and stable democracies of
the European Union, Feng’s typology provides a useful measurement to
capture major government change, where succession is determined by
clear and widely respected electoral rules
Control variables
Globalization, Economic Integration, and Demographics. The ratio of
exports plus imports to nominal GDP is often considered as an indicator
of interdependence. Data on trade openness are available from the World
Penn Tables and the Eurostat. However, this measure of economic inte-
gration and globalization cannot capture the effects of capital flows across
national borders, such as the surge in communications and interactions,
which is perhaps the major trait that distinguishes contemporary global-
ization from the high levels of trade and interconnectedness in the period
before World War. Foreign Direct Investment within each country is the
best available proxy, in time-series for all of the 14 European countries, as
it indicates the freedom of transferring resources form one country to the
other. Data on FDI are available from both the IFS and OECD.
The demographic variables (percentage of population over 64, percentage
of female labor, and unemployment under 25) come from the Eurostat
Statistical Yearbook (1989 and 2000 editions). 
Additional exogenous variables. Besides the exogenous variables that are
derived from the theoretical argument (e.g. globalization and demo-
graphic variables), the remaining exogenous variables (economic growth,
CIM, Left Government, and total population) estimate competing hypoth-
eses regarding changes in the levels of welfare and state capacity. The
socio-economic data are available from the Eurostat Statistical Yearbook
(1989 and 2000 editions), the International Labor Statistics,OECD, and
the World Development Indicators, World Bank.
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The Left variable (leftv) is the left party vote proportion of total
votes, compiled by Swank (1998).13 The inclusion of this variable is rel-
evant, since the common assumption is that social democrats and leftist
parties have stronger attachments to labor unions. As a result they will be
more receptive to pressures to increase unemployment benefits, and even
improve child care. Contract Intensive Money (CIM) is a measurement of
property rights and reliability of governmental policies. Data on CIM
can be found in Clague, et al. (1999). CIM= (M2-COB)/M2, where COB
is currency outside banks. Generally, individuals keep a larger portion of
their assets in currency if they do not rely on contracts and banking institu-
tions. I use CIM to capture institutional constraints that can explain the
reduction or increase in the state capacity variable and the ability of the state
to extract resources from society. Clearly, if people have concerns regarding
the reliability of governmental decisions, they will maintain their assets in
currency, which is harder to be assessed and taxed by the governments.
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
The core argument in this study is that social protection is critical for effec-
tive governance even under the stress of intensifying economic integration.
In Europe, welfare states were essential in building political consensus and
sustainable economic growth. The issue that arises from the integration
process within the European Union is whether this political perspective is
going to persist in the twenty one century or the pressures of economic
globalization, demographic changes, and withering state capacity are
going to alter the policy choices available to the governments. This study
provides an explanation of why arguments of “social dumping” and “race-
to-the bottom” do not apply in the case of the European welfare states.
Moreover, the empirical analysis shows that the process of economic inte-
gration, even on the eve of the introduction of the Euro, has not been a
threat to the social and economic rights of European citizens so far.
EXTERNAL CHALLENGES: GLOBALIZATION
H1 and H2 postulate that globalization has a dumping effect on welfare
transfers and state capacity. The empirical analysis of the 14 European
13Some studies—notably Hicks and Misra, 1993—show that the ideology of the governing
party accounts for differences in the levels of welfare spending. The most common argument is
that social democrats favor welfare institutions, while conservative governments try to mini-
mize the size of the government. However, welfare programs have been established not only by
social democrats, but many conservative governments as well, as in the UK after World War I
and the fascist regime in Norway during World War II. It is important to note that the very first
welfare institutions were established by Bismarck.
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countries shows that the reality is more complicated. The “race to the bot-
tom” effect is actually refuted by the empirical analysis.
Increasing economic integration has no direct negative effect on wel-
fare transfers. Trade openness has even a positive and significant effect
on welfare transfers and F.D.I. has a positive and insignificant effect. The
lack of evidence of any negative impact of globalization indicators is also
evident in equations 2 and 3 (Constitutional Government Change and
State Capacity respectively). This might seem a puzzling result, given the
common beliefs that increasing integration reduces both the levels of state
capacity and the size of welfare transfers, but confirms the argument of
this paper that welfare programs in the European countries have a clear
political goal. It is hard to imagine that even under the increasing pressures
of globalization European states will give up welfare states and through
welfare states the ability to intervene in society.
Despite the introduction of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and
policies such as the Stability and Growth Pact, Rhodes (2002), examining
the raw data on welfare expenditures as a percentage in the Eurozone for
the period 1990–1997, argues that there is no retrenchment process of the
continental model of European welfare state (vis-à-vis the Anglo-American
model). While European countries, such as Sweden, Netherlands, Belgium,
and even Italy, reduced governmental expenditures, they were careful not
to touch their elaborate welfare programs. In the period 1990–1997 there
was a convergence of nonwelfare expenditures for all European countries,
while large welfare programs remained intact. Even the poorer Southern
European countries, such as Italy, Greece, and Spain, have steadily
increased their welfare spending as a proportion of total benefits, while
the governments were careful to shape up the economies to meet the strin-
gent “Maastricht criteria” (Rhodes, 2002, pp. 316–317). The case of
Greece, which joined the EMU in the eleventh hour, is interesting since
there has been a clear upwards trend in social expenditures at least for the
period 1993–1997.
The ability of the European states to maintain their welfare programs
can be attributed to the autonomy the states have over national taxation
and fiscal policy (for more details see Lesage (2001), even controlling
for higher levels of financial and trade integration. Moreover, trade
openness can provide governments with additional income to finance
welfare programs that suffer from the increasing burden of their ageing
populations.
It is also interesting that neither trade openness nor increasing levels of
F.D.I. has a significant direct impact on state capacity. Given the positive
impact that trade openness has on the levels of welfare transfers, the net
impact of trade openness is positive for the European states’ state capac-
ity. Property rights (CIM) do not seem to account for levels of state
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capacity in this system of simultaneous equation, refuting previous argu-
ment by Schwartz (2001) that under the pressures of globalized markets
groups lose their property rights, and the income stream attached to these
rights.
Hypotheses 3–4 and 7–10 postulate the effect of the endogenous vari-
ables on one another. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, the empirical results
reveal a direct relationship between state capacity and welfare transfers,
as state capacity has a positive direct effect on welfare state provision.
Similarly, welfare transfers increase state capacity (consistent with Hypoth-
esis 8) and decrease the likelihood of government change (as suggested by
Hypothesis 9). This empirical result is clearly consistent with the argument
presented in this paper that welfare transfers are an important component
for political stability and social cohesion in European states. However,
contrary to Hypothesis 4, I find that a positive and significant effect of
state capacity on the likelihood of the government change. Likewise, the
results do not support Hypothesis 10, which postulates that the likelihood
of government change should reduce state capacity, as the empirical anal-
ysis suggests a positive and significant effect of higher probabilities of
government change on state capacity.
DOMESTIC CHALLENGES TO EUROPEAN WELFARE STATES
If the external challenges are not a real threat for European welfare states,
demographic and social changes should be the real concern for policy-
makers. Per H5 and H6 higher numbers of female labor and older people
will increase demands on welfare states. As Table 1 shows, the empirical
analysis confirms H5 regarding female participation in the workforce.
During the last twenty years, there has been a constant increase of women
entering the workforce even among women of childbearing age. This
social change is not uniform among all the European states; marital status
and number of children are still deterring factors for women to participate
fully in the economic life in Southern European countries, where interest-
ingly enough fertility rates are the lowest ones in the European Union.14 Yet,
the overall increase of female labor is evident even in those countries. The
economic participation of women creates an additional demand for child care
policies. Clear evidence that care is a major contributing factor for women’s
lower participation rates is provided by the percentage of single mothers who
14Integrated welfare institutions are not developed either in the southern European states,
where families used to have the primary role of caretakers, or the United Kingdom. As more
women enter the workforce, the ability of families to provide care to the elders will be reduced,
creating an urgent necessity for the welfare states to provide decent living conditions for those
65 and over.
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remain economically inactive. This situation is the case particularly in the UK
and Ireland, where only half of the single mothers with children under the age
of five are employed, a figure that is much lower even among married
women who have children (European Commission, 2000, p.11). Women
overwhelmingly occupy part-time jobs. Part-time employees do not partici-
pate in welfare state contributions and are not entitled to have social benefits;
Table 1. Joint Estimates of Welfare Expenditures, State Capacity, and
Government Instability
Welfare expenditure Coefficient Estimate Stand Error Z
Foreign direct Investment 0.565 0.503 1.120
State Capacity 34.473 8.717 3.950
Constitutional Govt Change 30.229 34.160 0.880
Unemployment 25 (%) 0.116 0.058 2.000
Female Labor (%) 0.724 0.236 3.070
Population over 65 (%) 0.141 0.544 0.260
Left Gvt 0.192 0.120 1.600
Trade Oppenness 12.890 5.197 2.480
Population −0.029 0.028 −1.010
Constant −73.739 27.580 −2.670
Constitutional Govt Change
Welfare Exp −0.015 0.004 −3.710
Foreign direct investment 0.002 0.006 0.280
Trade Oppenness −0.004 0.025 −0.150
Economic Growth −0.006 0.005 −1.070
Unemployment 25 (%) 0.000 0.001 −0.730
State Capacity 0.244 0.130 1.870
Population over 65 (%) 0.017 0.006 3.050
Population 0.000 0.000 1.450
Constant 0.097 0.250 0.390
State Capacity
Welfare Exp 0.030 0.008 3.720
Population over 65(%) −0.042 0.014 −2.880
Constitutional Govt Change 3.182 0.702 4.530
Foreign direct investment −0.014 0.016 −0.830
Trade Oppenness 0.069 0.083 0.830
CIM 0.782 0.741 1.050
Population −0.002 0.001 −1.530
Constant −0.405 0.817 −0.500
Equation Obs RMSE Chi2 P
Welfare Exp 266 7.690 73 0
Constitutional Govt Change 266 0.121 92.21 0
State Capacity 266 7.395 63.59 0
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therefore, they do not contribute to the financing of the welfare programs. As
more women enter the work force, the pressures for welfare programs cater-
ing to their needs will also increase. Similarly, unemployment among young
people increases demands on unemployment benefits.
The most interesting and counterintuitive result is that H6 (impact of
population over 64 on welfare transfers) is not confirmed by the empirical
analysis. Unlike the results of most of the previous studies, the higher
number of older people has no significant direct impact on welfare trans-
fers, but there is evidence that the aging of population is a burden on
European welfare states. The aging of population reduces state capacity
and increases political instability. Older people have stagnant or shrink-
ing incomes, reducing the available tax basis for governments. Hence,
higher numbers of citizens over 64 have adverse effects on how much the
government can offer to citizens, while the burden of supporting the state
and its programs is shifting to the shrinking working population (the ratio
now is one person over 64 to four people of working age, while the pro-
jection for 2020 is going to be a one to three ratio and by 2040 it will be a
one to two ratio). Moreover, as Table 1 shows, older people tend to be
active participants in the electoral process and are willing to vote out
governments that do not satisfy their demands (see in Table 1, the posi-
tive and significant coefficient of population over 64 on Government
Change). The projection is for higher numbers of older voters who will
favor programs that cover their needs rather than those of unemployed or
female labor.
The problems of the European welfare states are getting even worse
due to early retirement programs for specific professions and a large
portion of population that remains unemployed during the productive
years of 15–64. Aside from women who either do not enter the workforce
or exit quite early (in some European countries like Greece, married
women with kids have until recently had substantial benefits and an early
retirement age), there is a portion of men who are also unemployed of exit
the workforce at quite a young age. In the European countries, only 60%
of the working age adults are fully employed, and although women con-
sist of the majority of nonactive economic population, one third are men,
and 7% are unemployed (European Commission, 2000).
The real challenge for European welfare states comes from within as
they will be forced to restructure and reshape the existing welfare institu-
tions to meet the future demands of the population. The competing inter-
ests and demands of younger people and women vs. the older and retired
population, along with the shrinking of economically active populations,
poses the real threat for the future of European welfare states. In this pro-
cess increasing economic integration can be an asset rather than a liability
for the European governments.
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CONCLUSION
The notion that European welfare states have become obsolete seems pre-
mature given the empirical evidence presented in this study. I postulate
that the process of European integration has not altered the basic political
calculus of governments to use welfare states to maintain political power
and enhance political stability. To test the hypotheses empirically, I apply
a simultaneous equations’ model. The first major finding is that the glo-
balization indicators either have no direct impact on welfare transfers
(Foreign Domestic Investment), or the direct effect is positive (trade
openness). This result suggests that currently there is no “race to the
bottom” among the European welfare states. The second major finding is
that the real constraints for policy-makers come from domestic chal-
lenges, primarily demographic changes. The aging of the European popu-
lations crates a burden on welfare states since it reduces state capacity.
Moreover, as the demand for additional labor is increasing and women
become the target group, governments face competing demands over
welfare programs that increase social and political tensions. Ironically,
further economic integration can provide governments with additional
resources to face off some of the future constraints on welfare programs.
A policy option is to facilitate the active participation of women in the
labor force, restructuring the welfare programs away from the traditional
model, which has been based on a nuclear family with the father being the
primary breadwinner.
The introduction of the Euro in 12 out of the 15 European members of
the European Union and the admittance of 10 new member countries in
December of 2004 will bring unprecedented turbulences in European
social systems. Of primary importance are the differences in economic
and political structures between the original 15 members and the 10
newly admitted ones, most of which are former Communist economies.
The implications of such processes in the long-term viability of the
European welfare states need to be assessed.
As this study points out, welfare transfers remain a political choice
controlled very much by domestic factors, such as unemployment, ageing
of population, and female labor. The study can be improved by separately
looking at different components of welfare programs and health expendi-
tures and identify the impact that demographic trends have on their future.
Even though simultaneous models can be very sensitive to specification,
the presented empirical results indicate that the interaction of demo-
graphic factors with the ability of the states to reach the populations
should be an important component in the study of welfare states in the
face of increasing economic and political integration.
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